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Abstract--First, we introduce pairwise-bargained consistency with a reference point, and use as 
reference points the maxmin and the minmax value within pure strategies of a certain constant- 
sum bimatrix game, and also the game value within mixed strategies of it. Second, we show that 
the pairwise-bargained consistency with reference point being the maxmin or the minmax value 
determines the nucleolns in some class of transferable utility games. (This result is known in the 
bankruptcy games and the pseudoconcave games with respect to supersets of the managers.) This 
class of games whose element we call a pseudoconcave game with respect to essential coalitions, of 
course, includes the bankruptcy games and the pseudoconcave games with respect to supersets of 
the managers. It is proved that this class of games is exactly the same as the class of games which 
have a nonempty core that is determined only by one-person and (n- 1)-person coalition constraints. 
And we give a sufficient condition which guarantees that the bargaining set coincides with the core 
in this class of games. Third, we interpret the r-value of a quasibalanced transferable utility game by 
the pairwise-bargained consistency with reference point being the game value. Finally, by combining 
the second and the third results, if a transferable utility game in this class is also semiconvex, then 
the nucleolus and the T-vaiue are characterized by the pairwlse-bargained consistency with different 
reference points which are given by the associated bimatrix game. (~) 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All 
rights reserved. 
Keywords--TU-game, Pairwise-bargained consistency, Nucleolus, r-value, Core, Quasibalanced 
game, Semiconvex game, Bimatrix game. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It is known that the nucleolus of the bankruptcy game agrees with the contested garment 
consistent-rule (cf. [1]). In our terminology the nucleolus of the bankruptcy game is a unique 
pairwise-modest (or greedy)-bargained consistent allocation (cf. [2]). Also that the nucleolus of 
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the pseudoconcave game with respect o supersets of the managers i  a unique pairwise-modest- 
bargained consistent allocation (cf. [3]). That is, in some class of games, the nucleolus was 
characterized by a pairwise-bargaining property. Does the same hold for larger class of games? 
We will give some answer for this question in this paper: the nucleolus is a unique pairwise- 
modest (or greedy)-bargained consistent allocation in the class of games whose nonempty core is 
determined only by one-person and (n - 1)-person coalition constraints. Further, we show that 
the T-value of a quasibalanced game is a unique pairwise-medium-bargained consistent allocation. 
Thus, the nucleolus and the T-ValUe are characterized by the pairwise-bargained consistency with 
different reference points in some class of games. 
The paper consists of six sections. In Section 2, we introduce pairwise-bargained consistency 
with reference points. In Section 3, we study the class of games whose nonempty core is deter- 
mined only by one-person and (n - 1)-person coalition constraints. Sections 4 and 5 deal with 
the pairwise-bargained consistency of the nucleolus and that of the T-value, respectively. The 
last section concludes the paper with some remarks about bimatrix games that determine the 
reference points. 
2. PA IRWISE-BARGAINED CONSISTENCY 
Let us consider the following situation. 
SITUATION 1. Player i and j have to divide the total amount X. Player i( j) can claim r i j (X) 
(r j i(X)) against player j( i), respectively. We assume that X • R, and r{i'J}(X) := (ri j(X), 
r j i (X))  where rij : R ---* R and rji : R ~ R. 
In this case, it is quite natural to consider the following division rule: Natural division of the 
amount X between players i and j with reference point r. 
1. Players i and j first get r i j (X) and rj~(X), respectively. 
2. Then they divide the surplus (which may be negative) of the total amount equally. 
]VDr b,~ } Nl-)r { ~,J } That is, this Natural division ND r{~'j} (X) := (ND~ {~'~} (X), _._j  (X)) allocates - - - i  (X) 
and ND~ {~'j~ (X) to players i and j,  respectively: 
ND r{~'~} (X) := r i j (X) + 
ND5 {''j} (X) := r j i (X) + 
x - r~j (X)  - r~(X)  
2 
X - r~ j (X)  - r j~(X)  
{~.~} R 2 We say x ---- (x~, x j) E is bargained consistent with reference point r if ND r{~'~) (xi + x j) = 
x {i,j}, because there is no incentive for the players to reallocate the total amount xi + xj between 
them. 
Let us consider the following slightly different situation. 
SITUATION 2. Any player k of a couple i and j estimates that the smallest and largest amount 
which he can get are f (k)  and Ate, respectively. Both players i and j are expected to receive the 
amount x~ and xj, respectively, where f (k)  <_ xk <_ Ak for k = i, j. Should they accept he pair 
of allocations (xi, xj)? Or are there any incentives to reallocate the total amount X = xi q-xj 
between them? 
In order to convert Situation 2 to Situation 1 we offer several ways to determine reference 
points by using an associated bimatrix. If both players behave cautiously, they claim their 
smallest amount f(-). If both behave boldly, they claim their largest amount A .  But neither 
(f(i), f ( j ) )  nor (Ai, Aj) are efficient, that is, f( i)  + f ( j )  < X and Ai + Aj > X. To make the 
outcome fficient let us think in the following way: player i's strategy is to choose a behavior 
("C(autiously)" or "B(oldly)"). Player j 's  strategy is to choose a player ("Y(ou)" or 'T'). We 
suppose that the player chosen by player j 's  strategy behaves in the way player i chooses and the 
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other player who is not chosen by player j 's  strategy receives the surplus of the total amount. 
For example, if player/ 'chooses "C" and player j chooses 'T', then player j receives f ( j )  and 
player i receives the surplus, that is, X - f ( j ) .  Thus, we have a noncooperative constant-sum 
game given by the bimatrix in Table 1. 
Table 1. Associated bimatrix game, where f(i) + f( j )  < X = xl + xj <_ A i + Aj .  
Player j
Y(ou) I 
Player i C f(i), X - f(i) X - f ( j ) ,  f ( j )  
B Ai ,X - -A  i X - -A j ,A j  
Note that since the game is constant-sum, every Nash equilibrium gives each player his unique 
expected payoff. Also that the pair of game values (the pair of the expected payoffs of both 
players for any Nash equilibria) is given by (e i j (x) ,  e j i (x ) )  1 where 
(x~ + xj - y( i)  - / ( j ) ) (~  - y( i ) )  
e~(~)  :=  f ( i )  + 
Ai  - f ( i )  + A j  - f ( j )  ' 
ej i(x) :=  f ( j )  + (xi + x j  - f ( i )  - f ( j ) ) (A j  - f ( j ) )  
Ai  - f ( i )  + A j  - f ( j )  
(In this paper, we regard the expression of the form 
Aak 
m 
Ei=I ai 
(ai >_ O, i = 1 , . . . ,m)  
as 0 if the denominator is equal to 0.) 
Let us define c i j (x )  and di j (x )  to be the maxmin and minmax value (within pure strategies) 
of player i's part of the above bimatrix, and similarly c j i (x )  and dj i (x )  to be the maxmin and 
minmax value of player j 's  part of the above bimatrix, that is, 
cij (x) := max [f(i), xi + xj - Aj] and d~j (x) := min[Ai, x~ + xj - f ( j ) ] ,  
cj~(x) := max [f(j),  xi + xj - Ai] and dj i (x )  := min[Aj, xi + xj - f(i)]. 
Since this bimatrix game depends neither on x~ nor on xj but on X(= xi + xj), so do c.(x) ,  
d. (x), and e. (x). We summarize the useful properties of these values in the next lemma. 
LEMMA 1. The fol lowing relat ions hold: 
e~j(z) + e~(x)  = z~ + xj ,  (1) 
c~(z) + dji(x) = zi + z~ and 
cij(x) <_ eij(x) <_ dij(x) and 
eji(x) + dij(x) = xi + xj,  
c~i(z) < e~i(x) <_ dj,(z). 
(2) 
(3) 
PROOF. Equation (1) holds since the bimatrix game is a constant-sum game. Equation (2) 
follows from simple calculation. Equation (3) is a well-known property of a matrix game. | 
We calculate the Natural divisions with r = c, r = d, and r = e in the following lemma where 
c {i5) -- (cij, cji), d {i'j} = (dij, dji), and e {~,j} = (e~j, eji). 
iWe use abbreviation eli (x), c~j (x), and d~j (x) instead of precise notation eij (x {id} ), ci# (x {~,#) ), and dij (x{i'#)), 
respectively, where x{ i,j} := (xi, xj). 
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LEMMA 2. The Natura l  div is ions wi th  r = c, r = d, and r = e are g iven by  
~('.~ . . . .  d("J~, c~j(x) + d i j (x )  
ND i (x i  + x j )  = lvz) i (xi  + x j )  = 2 
c('.~) . . . .  d("¢~ , c~i(x) + d3i(x) 
NDj  (xi  + x j )  = + = 2 ~v~Jj (xi  x j )  
ND e'''~' (x,  + x~) = e {'J} (x{ ' J} ) .  
PROOF. By the definition of ND c(~'j) and the relation xi  + x j  - c j i (x )  = d i j (x )  (Lemma 1) we 
have 
x~ + z j  - c i¢ (z )  - c~(x)  c{i.J} ND i (xi  + x j )  = cij (x) + 
2 
c~j (z)  ÷ dij (x) 
2 
Also by xi  + x j  - d j i (x )  = c i j (x )  we have 
xi  + x j  - d i j (x )  - d j i (x )  
i tx~ + x j )  = d i j (x )  + 
2 
cij (z)  ÷ dij (z)  
2 
Finally, it follows that ND e~'~ (xi + x j )  = e{ i J} (x  {i'j}) because e i j (x )  + e j i (x )  = x i  + x j  
(Lemma 1). | 
By this lemma we conclude that the Natural division in Situation 2 with reference point c 
coincides with that with d and is given by the midpoint M of the line segment AB, where 
A := (c i j (x ) ,d j~(x) )  and B := (d i j (x ) ,c j~(x) )  (see Figure 1). And that the Natural division in 
Situation 2 with reference point e is given by E at which two lines AB and FG intersect, where 
F := ( f ( i ) ,  f ( j ) )  and G := (A~, Aj) (see Figure 1). 
~ 2~2 
A :---- (cij(x),dji(x)), B :-- (d / j (x ) , c j i (x ) ) ,  C :-- (cij(x),cji(x)), D :---- (dij(x),dji(x)), 
E := ND e{'J} (xl --bxj) = e{iJ}(x{i'J}), F := ( f ( i ) , f ( j ) ) ,  G := (A i ,A j ) ,  
M := ND c{~J} (xi q- xj) = ND d(~J} (xi q- xj),  
PcY := ( f ( i ) ,X  - f(i)), PcI :---- (X -  f(j), f ( j ) ) ,  PBY := (Ai, X --Ai), PBI : :  (X -  Aj, Aj), 
Fll := (f(i), Aj) ,  P12 := (X - f ( j ) ,X  - Ai), F21 := (Ai, f ( j ) ) ,  P22 := (X - A j ,X  -- f(i)). 
Figure 1. Some pairs of payoffs when A = PB I  and B ---- Pcl. 
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Therefore, if we adopt c or d as a reference point and x is bargained consistent with reference 
point c or d (ND c{~'j} (xi + xj) = NDd{"JJ(xi + xj)  = x{i,J)), that is, x {i,j} coincides with the 
point M, then the division x {i,j} is acceptable between players i and j.  If we regard e as a 
reference point and x {i,j) is bargained cons~tent with reference point e {i,j) (e{i,J) = x(i,J}), that 
is, x coincides with the point E, then the division x{ ~,j} is acceptable between players i and j.  
Let x E R N be such that f ( i )  < xi < Ai for all i E N and r = (rij)(i,j)eNxN, i¢j where N is 
the set of the players and rij : R --* R. We say that x is paimvise-bargained consistent with 
reference point r if x {i,j} = (xi ,xj)  is bargained consistent with reference point r for all i , j  E N 
and i ~ j ,  that is, ND rt~'j} (xi + xj) = x {i,j} for all i , j  E N and i ~ j.  
We use as reference points three points c, d, and e which were already mentioned in this section. 
By Lemma 1, equation (3), we also use the term pair'wise-modest (medium, greedy)-bargained 
consistent in place of pairwise-bargained consistent with reference point c (e, d), respectively. 
3. PSEUDOCONCAVE GAME 
WITH RESPECT TO ESSENTIAL COALITIONS 
Let (N, v) be a transferable utility game (TU-game) where N is the set of players and v : 2 g --+ R 
such that v(0) = 0. We call x E R N an allocation if 
xi = v( N). 
iEN 
And define I (v) to be the set of all allocations which satisfy individual rationality, that is, 
The core C(v).of a TU-game (N,v)  is defined as 
/ r / C(v) := xER N ~x i=v(N)  and ~x j_>v(S) ,  for a l lScN . iEN jES 
An objection of player i against another player j with respect o x E I(v) in the game (N, v) is 
a pair (y; S) where i E S C N, j ¢ S, and y := (Yk)kes satisfying Ekes  Yk = v(S) and Yk > Xk 
for k E S. A counterobjection to the above objection (y; S) is a pair (z; T) where i !g T C N, 
j E T, and z := (Zk)keT satisfying ~-~keT Zk = v(T) and Zk > Xk for k E T and zk > Yk 
for k E T M S. The bargaining set A/[(v) of a TU-game (N,v) is defined as follows: a vector 
x E I(v) belongs to Ad(v) if for any objection of one player against another player with respect 
to x in the game (N, v), there exists a counterobjection. 
In this section, we first consider a necessary and sufficient condition for the core C(v) to 
be determined only by one-person and ( n - 1)-person coalition constraints. Second, we offer 
a sufficient condition which guarantees that the bargaining set AJ(v) of such class of games 
coincides with the core C(v). Then we treat the bankruptcy problem as an example. 
PROPOSITION 3. Let f ( i )  := v({i}) and A i := v(N)  - v (N  - {i}), where (N,v)  is a TV-game 
and i E N. Then the following three statements are equivalent. 
(i) The TU-game (N, v) satisfies 
v( S) <_ max 
f( i )  < Ai, 
[~f ( i ) ,v (N) -  - sA~] '  for a l lScN,  S~O,  (4) 
for a11 i e N, and ~ f( i )  < v(N)  < ~ A,. (5) 
iEN iEN 
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(ii) Let h(8) := ~jes  Aj + ~-~dEN-S f(J) for all S C N. And let MC(v) := {S I h(S) < 
v(N) < h(SU {i}) for ali i • N -  S}. 2 MC(v) ¢ 0. For every R • MC(v) and every 
i • N - R, there exists an x • C(v) (which depends on R and i) such that 
A j, for all j • R, 
xj := f(j), for edl j • N - R - {i}. (6) 
(iii) The core C(v) is nonempty and satisfies 
PROOF. We prove (1): (i) ~ (iii), (2): (iii) ~ (ii), and (3): (ii) ~ (i). 
(1) (i) ~ (iii). It suffices to show that, if x • R g satisfies ~-~jEN xj = v(N) and f(i) < 
xi < Ai for all i • N, then ~jesx J  > v(S) for all S C N, S ~ 0. Let S c N, 
S ¢ O. It follows, on the one hand, ~-~jes xj > ~jes  f(J), and on the other, ~jes  xj = 
v(N) - ~-~dEN-S Xj > v(N) - ~-~jEN-S Aj. Therefore, 
j~sxj. >_max [j~sf(j),v(N )-jeaN_8 Aj] >_v(S), 
where the last inequality is due to assumption (4). Nonemptiness of the core follows 
immediately from (5). 
(2) (iii) ~ (ii). Write g(v) := {x • RN[ ~-~dEg xj = v(N) and f(i) < xi _< Ai for all i • g} .  
Since xi > v({i}) is equivalent to xi > f(i) and ~-~deg-{i} xj > v(Y - {i}) to xi _< Ai 
for x • R N satisfying ~-~jeg Xj = v(g) ,  we have H(v) D C(v) for any (N, v). Thus, note 
that "C(v) -- H(v)" ¢* "H(v) C C(v)" ¢* "Every extreme point in H(v) is contained 
in C(v)". C(v) ~ ~ implies (5), therefore, h satisfies the following relations: 
h(S - {kl}) _< h(S) < h(S U {k2}), 
h(O) < v(N) < h(N). 
fo rk lES ,  k2EN-S ,  (7) 
(8) 
(3) 
If h(T) < v(N) < h(T U {C}), T C N - {~}, then we obtain an extreme point in H(v) of 
the following form: 
Aj, for jET ,  
• xj := f(j), for j E N-  T -  {~}, (9) 
v(N) - ~-~jET A j  -- ~-~jeN-T-{~} f(J), for j = 5. 
Now we prove (iii) ~ (ii). By (7),(S) we have MC(v)  ¢ 0. Since h(S) < v(N) < h(SU{i}) 
for S E AAC(v) and i E N - S, we have a desired core allocation given by (9) applied 
to T = S and C = i. 
(ii) ~ (i). Note that (ii) implies that the core C(v) is not empty, so (5) holds. (4) holds 
for S = N trivially. Suppose that S C N, S ¢ 0, S ~ N satisfies v(N) - ~ jeg-s  Aj > 
~jES f(J), that is, h(N,  S) < v(N). By (7),(8), there exists T D N - S such that T E 
MC(v). Therefore we have, by using the core allocation x given by (6) with R = T D 
N - S, 
v(N) -  ~_, Aj =v(N) -  ~ x j=~xj>_v(S) ,  
j EN-S  jEN-S  jCS 
2If h(N) = v(N), then we define J~4C(v) :~- {N}. 
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which proves (4). On the other hand, suppose that S C N, S ~t 0, S ¢ N satisfies 
~-~d~s f( J)  > v(N) - )-~deN-S Aj, that is, h(N - S) > v(N). By (7),(S), there exists 
T c N - S, T ¢ N - S such that T G A4C(v). Therefore, we have, by using the core 
allocation x given by (6) with R = T C N - S(S C N - R) and i E N - S - T, 
f ( j )  = > v(S),  
jGS jes 
which also proves (4). 
Let us call a coalition S essential if v(S) > )-~ies v({i}). Also call a TU-game (N, v) pseudo- 
concave w.r.t. 3 essential coalitions if it satisfies (4),(5). If a coalition S is not essential, then (4) 
is automatically satisfied. If a coalition S is essential, then (4) reduces to 
v(S)<v(N)+ E (v (N) -v (N-{ j} ) ) ,  
j EN-S  
which is referred as pseudoconcavity. Thus, our definition of pseudoconcavity w.r.t, essential 
coalitions forces the pseudoconcavity only for essential coalitions. By using this term, we restate 
the above proposition as the following corollary. 
COROLLARY 4. A TU-game (N, v) has a nonempty core which is determined only by one-person 
and (n -  1)-person coalition constraints if and only f l i t  is pseudoconcave w.r.t, essential coalitions. 
A related result is summarized in the next remark. 
REMARK 5. The first condition (4) is more important han the other condition (5) because the 
latter only guarantees the nonemptiness of the core. This first condition (4) is satisfied if (N, v) 
is pseudoconcave w.r.t, supersets of the managers. The pseudoconcavity w.r.t, supersets of the 
managers was introduced in [3,4]. Let N = M U W with M N W = 0 and W ~t 0. A TU-game 
(N,v) is said to be pseudoconcave w.r.t, supersets of the managers if it satisfies the following 
condition (10),(11) (and (5) for the nonemptiness of the core): 
v(S)=O,  for a l lScN,  S~0,  w i thM~S,  (10) 
v(S) > o and v(N) - v(S) >_ 
for all S c N, S ~t O, 
E (v(N) - v (N-  {i})) 
i EN-S  
with M c S. 
(ii) 
One story of this game is as follows: players are either managers or workers. There is no profit 
without the unanimity agreement of all the managers, which means (10). Condition (11) means 
that for any coalition S including all the managers, that is, superset of the managers, it is 
more profitable to form the grand coalition N than to stay at the original coalition S on the 
understanding that every player i outside the coalition S gets his marginal contribution (v(N) - 
v (N-{ i} ) )  w.r.t, the grand coalition N. We now show that pseudoconcave games w.r.t, supersets 
of the managers are pseudoconcave w.r.t, essential coalitions. By (10),(11), we have v(.) > 0. 
Therefore, if v(S) = O, then (4) holds. If v(S) > 0, then S ~ M, and (4) follows from (11). 
To investigate more closely the relationship between our condition (4) and the pseudoconcave 
condition w.r.t, supersets of the managers (10),(11), suppose v(-) > 0, and let M := {i E N ] 
v(g  - {i}) -- 0} be the set of the managers. And further assume that v({j}) < v(N - {i}) for 
all i E M and all j E N - {i}, that is, the worth of every one-person coalition v({j}) is zero if 
3Hereafter, we abbreviate "with respect o" as "w.r.t. ' .  
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there exists some manager i other than j. Then our condition (4) (with (5) for the nonemptiness 
of the core) becomes 
~(s) > 0 
v(S)=O, for a l lScN,  8~0,  w i thM~S,  
and v(S)<-max[i~sv({i})'v(N)-jEN-SE (v (N) -v (N-{ j} ) ) ] ,  
for a l lScN,  S~0,  w i thMcS.  
Note that every essential coalition is a superset of the managers. Inour  condition (4), it is not 
necessary for every coalition including all the managers (superset of the managers) to satisfy 
condition (11). It requires only essential coalitions to satisfy condition (11). 
REMARK 6. As will be discussed later (see Remark 13), the bankruptcy game is not always 
pseudoconcave w.r.t, supersets of the managers but still pseudoconcave w.r.t, essential coalitions 
(see Lemma 11). We conclude that our condition (4) is milder than (10),(11). 
We offer a sufficient condition which guarantees that the bargaining set A~t (v) of pseudoconcave 
game (N, v) w.r.t, essential coalitions coincides with the core C(v). First, we need the following 
lemma. 
LEMMA 7. Suppose that (N, v) satisfies (4), (5) and that x E I(v) -C(v). If there exist jo, Jl E N 
such that Jo ~ jl, Xjo > Ajo, and 
E xj ÷ Xjo >_ v(S U {j0}), for all S C N - {j0,jl}, (12) 
jEs 
then x ¢ M(v). 
PROOF. Let yj := xj ÷Ej for j E N -  (j0} such that ej > 0 for j E N -  (j0} and ~-~jeN-{jo} ej ---- 
x jo--Ajo.  Sinceyj > xj for j E N - ( j0}  and~jeN_{jo} YJ =v(N- ( jo}) ,  (Y ;N-{ j0})  is 
an objection of a player other than j0 (especially j l )  against player j0. Now we show that there 
exists no counterobjection to the objection (y; N - (j0}). It is sufficient o show that 
Ey j+x jo>v(SU( jo}) ,  fo ra l lScN- ( jo , j l} .  
jEs 
If S ~ ~, then this inequality follows directly from (12) since ~-~jes YJ > ~':~jes xj. If S = 0, then 
this inequality follows from the fact that xjo > Ajo > f(jo) = v((j0}). Therefore, x ~ A/I(v). | 
The following proposition is already known (cf. [5, Chapter 2, Example 5.3]), but we prove it 
by using Lemma 7 for the sake of completeness. 
PROPOSITION 8. The bargaining set ~4(v) coincides with the core C(v) for any three-person 
TU-game (N, v) whose core C(v) is nonempty. 
PROOF. Note that any three-person TU-game (N, v) with nonempty core satisfies (4),(5) and 
that C(v) C 2~4(v) holds for any TU-game (N, v). Therefore, we need to prove 2~4(v) C C(v). 
Suppose that x E I(v)-C(v). Then there exist j0, Jl, and j such that xjo > Ajo, xjl <_ Ajl, and 
(jo, j I, j } = ( 1, 2, 3 }. Inequality (12) holds since xj ÷ Xjo -- v ( N ) - x j, > v ( N ) - A j, _-- v ({j, jo }), 
where the first equality follows from x E I(v), the second equality from the definition of Aj~, and 
the inequality from the assumption of j l .  We conclude from Lemma 7 that Ad(v) C C(v). | 
Now we give a sufficient condition which guarantees that the bargaining set Az/(v) of pseu- 
doconcave game (N, v) w.r.t, essential coalitions coincides with the core C(v) in the following 
proposition. 
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PROPOSITION 9. Suppose that (N,v) satisfies (4),(5). Let j*,j** • N such that Aj.  - f ( j * )  = 
min{Aj -- f ( j )  [ j • N}, Aj.. -- f(j**) = max{Aj -- f ( j )  [ j • g},  and j* # j**. If 
v(N) < E f(J) + At" + At'*' (13) 
jEN-{j*,j**} 
then Ad(v) = C(v). 
PROOF. As in the proof of Proposition 8, we prove the sufficient condition (12). Note that 
Y~jes xj + xJo >- Y~jes f ( j )+ f(jo) since x 6 I(v). Therefore, it suffices to prove ~jes  xj+Xjo >- 
v(N) - ~jeN-SU{jo} At for all S C N - {j0,j l}. We distinguish two cases. 
CASE 1. (zj . .  > At**). Set j0 := j** and j l  any element other than j0. Then we have 
xj + Xjo _> J(j) + Ar- .  
jes jes 
On the other hand we have 
E 
jeN-StA{j**} 
Aj = v(N) - E (Aj - f( j)) - E f(J) 
jeN-Stg{j*" } jeN- St3{j** } 
< v(N) - Aj. + f(j*) - E f(J) 
jeN-StA{j** } 
< f(J*) + s(J) + Ar.  - I(J) 
jeN-{j*,j**} jeN-Su{j**} 
= E f(J) + Aj. . ,  
j6S 
where the first inequality follows from Aj - f( j)  > O, IN - SU {J**}l >- 1 and the definition of j*, 
and the second inequality from (13). Therefore, (12) holds. 
CASE 2. (Xj** <_ A j**). Set j l  := J** and J0 any element which satisfies Xjo > Ajo. If S = 
.(N)- E 
N - {Jo, J** }, then we have 
jeN-SU{jo} 
Aj = v(N) - Aj. .  
<_ v(N) - xj.. 
= E Xj + Xjo , 
j6S 
by xj** < Aj . . .  Thus, (12) holds. If S # N - {Jo,J**}, then we have 
v(g) - E Aj = 
j6N--SU{jo} 
< 
<_ 
<_ 
v(N) - E (Aj - f( j))  - E f(J) 
jeN-- SO{jo } jEN-St.J{jo } 
v(Y) - Aj. - Aj. .  + f(j*) + f(j**) - E 
j~N-SU{jo} 
E f(J) + f(jo) 
jES 
E xj + Xjo, 
jes 
f(J) 
where the first inequality follows from j** • N - S t3 (jo}, IN - S U {Jo}l > 1, and the definition 
of j*, and the second inequality from (13). Therefore, (12) holds. II 
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REMARK 10. It was proved in [4] that the bargaining set Ad(v) coincides with the core C(v) 
if (N, v) is a pseudoconcave game w.r.t, supersets of the managers which has at least one manager. 
We show that our sufficient condition (13) holds for pseudoconcave game (N, v) w.r.t, supersets 
of the managers if IM[ _> 1. If [M[ > 1, then we have f ( j )  = 0 for j E N, Aj = v(N)  for j E M, 
Aj** = v(N)  for some manager j**, and Aj. > 0 for some worker j*. If [M[ = 1, then we 
have f ( j )  = 0 for j C W, Aj.. = v(N)  for the manager j**,4 and Aj. _> 0 for some worker j*. 
Thus, (13) holds if [M[ > 1. Therefore, our Proposition 9 is regarded as an extension of the 
result in [4]. 
EXAMPLE. BANKRUPTCY PROBLEM. A bankruptcy problem (see [1,6]) is defined as an ordered 
pair (E;d) where E E R and d = (dl ,d2, . . . ,d ,~) e R "~ such that di _> 0 for all i = 1 , . . . ,n  
n and 0 <_ E <_ ~-~j=l dj. One story of the problem is as follows. A man died leaving debts 
dl, d2, . . . ,  dn, totalling at least as much as his estate E. How should the n creditors allocate the 
total amount E among them? 
To formulate this bankruptcy problem in game theoretic terms, let N be the set of creditors, 
and we use the following bankruptcy game (N, rE;d) introduced in [6]: 
VE;d(S) :~-- max[0, E - d (g  - S)], for all S C N, S ¢ 0, (14) 
where d(S) := )-~-jes dj for all S c N, S ~ 0, and d(O) := 0. 
We obtain the following useful emma about the bankruptcy game. The lemma states that the 
bankruptcy games are pseudoconcave w.r.t, essential coalitions. 
LEMMA 11. The bankruptcy game (N, VE;d) Of (14) satisfies 
VE;d({i}) = max [0, E - d(N) + di] , 
VE;d(N) -- VE;d(N -- {i}) = min [E, di], 
PROOF. 
tion 3. 
for all i E N. 
C(VE;d) = { x 6 RN t ~-~ xj -~ E (15) 
+ di] < xi _< min[E, di], for all i e N I . max[0, Z d(N) 
Although these results are already known, we prove (15) by showing (4),(5) of Proposi- 
The second term of the right-hand side of (4) is equal to E - ~ ieN-S  min[E,d~], which is 
greater than or equal to E - ~-~ieg-s di. Therefore, (4) holds if VE;d(S) = E - d(N)  + d(S). 
If VE;d(S ) = 0, then (4) holds because the right-hand side of it is greater than or equal to 0 
by VE;d(') ~__ O. 
Since 0 <_ E, 0 < di, E - d(N) + di <_ E, and E - d(N) + di <_ di, it follows that the first part 
of (5) holds. 
Finally, we show the second part of (5), that is, 
max[0, E - d (Y )  + d~] <_ E < ~ min [E, di]. (16) 
iEN iEN 
FIRST INEQUALITY. If the first summation of the above expression has only one positive term, 
say E -d (N)  + di, then this term is less than or equal to E. If the first summation of (16) has at 
least two positive terms, say (E  - d(N) + di) + (E - d(N) + dk) +. . . ,  then by using the upper 
bounds dk for the second term and so on, we have 
(E  - d(N)  + di) + (E - d(N)  + dk) + . . . <_ (E - d(N) + di) + dk + . . . .  E - d (N  - S) < E, 
whereS={jeg[E -d(N)+d j  >0}. 
4Aj** - f(j**) = v(N) - v({j**}) > )-~jew Aj > Aj for j e W from (11). 
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SECOND INEQUALITY. If there exists some i such that min[E, di] = E, then the second inequality 
of (16) follows immediately. I fE  _> di for all i • N, then the second inequality of (16) also follows 
from E < d(N). II 
Some remarks concerning the bankruptcy game are given. 
REMARK 12. We can prove another epresentation (see [2]) of the core of the bankruptcy game 
different from (15): 
(17) 
REMARK 13. From Remark 5 the set M of all managers for the bankruptcy game (N, rE;d) 
is given by M = {i 6 N I d~ _> E}. Also by Remark 5, the bankruptcy game (N, VE;a) is 
pseudoconcave w.r.t, supersets of the managers if and only if every coalition S including M 
satisfies (11), that is, Ej6N-M dj <_ E. Let Y = {1,2,3}, E = 100, and d = (100,90,80). 
Then M = {1}, while d2 4- d3 > E. Therefore, this bankruptcy game is not pseudoconcave w.r.t. 
supersets of the managers. 
We conclude this section by showing that if pseudoconcave game (N, v) w.r.t, essential coali- 
tions is also convex, then it is closely related to the bankruptcy game. 
PROPOSITION 14. Let f(i) := v({i}) and Ai := v(N) -v (g -{ i} )  where (N, v) is a TV-game and 
i 6 N. Suppose that (N, v) satisfies (4),(5). If (N,v) is convex, then (N,w) is the bankruptcy 
game (N, rE;d) , where w(S) := v(S) - ~-'~jes f(J) for all S C N, E := v(N) - E j6N f(J), 
and dj := Aj -- f( j)  for j 6 N. 
PROOF. For any S C N such that S # @,N, we express S and N-S  as follows: S = {j l , - - .  ,js} 
and N - S = {js+l,... ,jn}. Let x 6 R N be such that xj, := v({jl}), xjl := v({jl,... ,ji}) - 
v({j l , . . .  ,ji-1}) for i = 2,. . .  ,n. Theconvexity of (N,v) implies thatx  • C(v) (see [5]), that is, 
f( j l )  N v({jl}) < Aj,, 
f(Ji) <- v({j l , . . .  ,Ji}) - v({jb. . .  ,Ji-1}) < Aj,, for i = 2 , . . . ,n .  
By summing up over i = 1 , . . . , s ,  we obtain v(S) > ~-~jes f(J)" By summing up over i = 
s + 1, . . . ,  n, we obtain v(S) > v(N) - ~ j6N-S  A j .  Thus, we have, from (4) 
v(S) = max I ( j ) ,v(Y)  - j  -s  AJ . 
It follows immediately that 
w(S) :=  v(S) - E f(J) = max 
j 6S  
= max 
0, v (N) -  jean f ( j ) -  E 
• j eN-S  
(Aj - f ( j ) ) ]  
wheredj >0for jENand0<E<~jeNd j .  | 
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4. NUCLEOLUS: PAIRWISE-MODEST 
(OR GREEDY)-BARGAINED CONSISTENCY 
From now on we apply palrwise-bargained consistency to TU-games. In this section, we inves- 
tigate the pairwise-bargalned consistency with reference point c or d. If we interpret f and A 
properly, the pairwise-modest (or greedy)-bargained consistency is closely related to the nucleolus 
for TU-games for which its nonempty core is determined only by one-person and (n - 1)-person 
coalition constraints. We set A~ := v(N) - v (N  - {i}) and f ( i )  := v({i}) for all i E N as in the 
previous ection, that is, every player estimates that the largest amount which he can get is his 
marginal contribution w.r.t, the grand coalition N and that the smallest amount he can claim is 
the worth v({i}) he gets only by himself. Therefore, it should be noted that a pairwise-modest 
(or greedy)-bargained consistent allocation of (N, v) depends first on the total amount v(N),  and 
second, on ( f ( i ) ) ieY and (A i ) ie  N = (v(N) - v (N  - {i}))ieN through reference point c (or d), 
respectively. 
We need some definitions to introduce the nucleolus and the kernel. 
The excess of a coaliton S with respect o a vector x E R g in a TU-game (N, v) is defined as 
eV(S, =):= v(S) - 
jES 
The maximum surplus s~j (x) of player i over another player j with respect o an allocation x in 
a TU-game (N, v) is given by 
sVj(x) := max[eV(S,x) [ i E S C N, j • S]. 
The kernel IC(v) of (N, v) is the set of all vectors x E I(v) satisfying for all i, j E N, i ~ j, 
[s~j(x) - s~(x)] [xj - v({j})] _< 0 and [s~i(x) - sVj(x)] [xi - v({i})] _< 0. 
Let-O(x) be the 2n-tuple whose components are the excesses ev(S, x), S c N, arranged in non- 
increasing order. Define the lexicographic order --<~L as  follows: 8(x) <L 8(Y) if there exists an 
integer k(1 < k < 2 n) such that ~i(x) = 8~(y) for i _ i < k, whereas 8k(x) < 8k(Y); O(x) <--L 8(Y) 
if either 8(x) = O(y) or 8(x) <L 8(y). 
It is known that the set Af(v) := {x E I(v) [ O(x) <--L 8(y) for all y E I(v)} is a singleton 
(cf. [5]). The nucleolus 71(v) of (N, v) is defined as a unique element of J~(v). 
Before showing that the nucleolus ~(v) of a pseudoconcave game (N, v) w.r.t, essential coali- 
tions is a unique pairwise-modest (or greedy)-bargalned consistent allocation, we consider the 
bankruptcy game. We already know that the bankruptcy game (N, VE;d) is pseudoconcave w.r.t. 
essential coalitions from Lemma 1 1. 
LEMMA 15. Let f( i )  :=  VE;d({i}) and Ai :=  VE;d(Y)  -- VE;d(N -- {i}) ,  where (N, rE;d) is the 
bankruptcy game of (14) and i E N. 
(i) The following holds for any core allocation x and ali i , j  E N, i ~ j: 
cq x {~J} = max [0, x~ + xj - dj], 
di~ ;a (x {iJ}) = min [xi + xj,di]. 
(ii) The set of pedrwise-modest (or greedy)-bargained consistent allocations coincides with the 
intersection of the kernel.and the core which consists of a unique aJlocation ~/(VE;a) called 
nucleolus. 
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PROOF. Note that if (i) is proved, the pairwise-modest-bargained consistency in this paper is the 
same as the (contested garment) CG-consistency (see [1,5]) and the pairwise-greedy-bargained 
consistency is the same as that in [2], therefore (ii) is already known. Now we show (i). By 
Lemma 11 and the definition of c and d we have 
c i j  = max [max [0, E - d(N)  + di], xi + x j  - min [E, dj]] 
= max [max [0, E - d(N)  + di], max [xi + xj  - E,  xi + x j  - dj]] 
= max [0, E - d(N)  + d~, xi + x j  - E,  xi + x j  - dj], 
(18) 
diVj e;~ (x {i'j}) -- min [min [E, di] ,x i  + xj  - max[0, E - d(N)  ÷ dj]] 
(19) 
-- min IF, di, z i  + x j ,  z i  + z j  - E + d( g )  - dj]. 
Since x E C(VE;d), we have 0 < xi < di, xi + xj < E, and di + dj - xi - x j  < d(N)  - E by (17). 
This means (the first term) > (the third) and (the second) < (the fourth) in (18) and (19). 
Therefore, the result follows. | 
Let 7~(v) be the set of pairwise-modest (or greedy)-bargained consistent allocations of (N, v) 
where f ( i )  = v((i}) and As = v(N)  - v (g  - {i}) for all i • N. Then Lemma 15(ii) says 
that ~2)(VE;d) = ~(VE;d) CI C(VE;d) = {l](YE;d) }. We conclude this section by stating the general 
result for the pseudoconcave games w.r.t, essential coalitions. 
THEOREM 16. Let f ( i )  := v({i}) and Ai := v(g)  - v (N  - {i}) where (N ,v )  is a TU-game 
and i • N. g (N, v) satis/ies (4),(5), then the pairwise-modest (or greedy)-bargained consistency 
determines a unique allocation which coincides with the nucleolus ~(v). 
PROOF. Suppose the TU-game (N, v) is zero-normalized, i.e., v({i}) = 0 for all i • N. Consider 
the bankruptcy game (N, vE;d) associated with the estate E := v (N)  and claims di := Ai = 
v(N)  - v (N  - {i}) for all i • N. By assumption (4),(5), we have that Proposition 3(iii) holds 
with f ( i )  = 0 for all i • N. Together with (17), it follows that both cores coincide, that 
is, C(v) = C(v~;d) .  
Now we show that P(v)  = ~2~(VE;d) .  Note that P(v) depends on the worth of the grand 
coalition v(N)  and ( f ( i ) ) iEg  = (v({ i}) ) ieg,  (Ai)~eg = (v(N)  - v (N  - {i}))iEN through 
And that "P(VE;d) depends on E and (d i ) iey through, by Lemma 15(i), 
cij x {i'jt = max [0, xi + x~ - dj]. 
Since (N, v) is supposed to be zero-normalized, we obtain 7~(v) = "P(vE;a). 
It is known that if C(w)  = C(u) ¢ 0, then rl(w), rl(u) • lC(w) Cl C(w)  = t~(u) Cl C(u) (see [5, 
Chapter II, Corollary 6.8, Theorem 7.8, and Theorem 7.9]). And by Lemma 15(ii) we know 
that ~(VE;d) = /C(VE;e) Cl C(VE;d) = {rl(VE;d)}. Therefore, we have rl(v) • ~(v) A C(v)  = 
K.(VE;d) n C(vE;a) =. {rl(VE;d)}, thus, rJ(v) = rl(VE;d). Together with ~(v) = "P(VE;d) = {rl(VE;d)} 
it follows that 7~(v) = {r](v)}, where the TU-game (N, v) is zero-normalized. 
If the game (N, v) is not zero-normalized, consider its zero-normalization (N, w) given by 
w(S)  := v(S)  - ~ j~s  v({j}) for all S C N. Then the game (N, w) inherits the properties (4),(5) 
from the game (N, v). Since the game (N, w) is zero-normalized, it follows from the previous 
part that 7~(w) =- {~?(w)}. Since "P(w) =- ~(v)  - (v( ( i}) ) ieN and rl(w) --- rl(v) - (v({i}))ieN, we 
arrive at 7~(v) -- (rl(v)}. | 
REMARK 17. From the proof of the above theorem, if (N, v) is a zero-normalized pseudoconcave 
game w.r.t, essential coalitions, then the core structure, the set 7~(v), and the nucleolus of (N, v) 
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are the same as those of the bankruptcy game (N, rE;d), respectively, where E = v(N) and 
d j=A j  for a l l jEN .  
The following remark is concerned with related works. 
REMARK ]-8. Note again that the pseudoconcave game w.r.t, supersets of the managers (with 
the nonempty core condition) satisfies (4),(5), as we mentioned in Remark 5. See [3] for a more 
detailed discussion about the resulting unique palrwise-modest-bargained consistent allocation. 
Driessen [7] considered the bilateral assignment market game by applying the pairwise-bargained 
consistency with some other reference point. The bargained consistency is applied not to all pairs 
of players but to appropriately chosen pairs, and the core structure of the bilateral assignment 
market game is different from ours. 
The next remark shows how to compute 7~(v). 
REMARK 19. Since "x E 7~(v) '' ¢=~ "x~ = (c~j(x) + dVj(x))/2 for all i , j  E N, i ¢ j " ,  a pairwise- 
modest (or greedy)-bargained consistent allocation x is a solution of the following system of 
(nonlinear) equations: 
min [xi - f(i), Aj -- xj] = min [xj -- f( j) ,  Ai - xi], 
xi = v(N), 
iGN 
for alli, j EN ,  iC j ,  (20) 
(21) 
and, by following the well-known procedure (see, for example, [5, p. 155]), x is given by, for 
all i E N, 
x~()~)= I min[f(i)+)~'f(i)+Ai]2 ' ifv(N)<~'~deN(Aj+f(J))-- 2 ' 
max[  Ai - ~' f( i)  + Ai ] 2 , otherwise, 
where ~ is determined by ZieN Xi(/~) = v(N). 
We summarize another proof of the above theorem briefly in the next remark. 
REMARK 20. In general ifC(v) ¢ 9, then {~(v)} C C(v)MlC(v) (see [5, Chapter II, Theorems 7.8 
and 7.9]). Also the following holds: C(v) N lC(v) = {z E C(v) I 5~(x) = 5~(z) for all i , j  E N, 
i ~ j} (see [3,5, Chapter II, Theorem 6.7]), where 8~j(x) := max[~ E R I x - 5e i + 5eJ E C(v)] 
and e i E R n is the ith unit vector. If (N, v) is pseudoconcave w.r.t, essential coalitions, then 
5~j(z) = min[x i -  f ( i ) ,A j  - z j ]  (see [3]). Therefore, we have {r/(v)} C 7~(v). Since every 
x E 79(v) satisfies the above equations (20),(21), and these equations have a unique solution (see, 
for examplel [3,5, Chapter VI, Theorem 3.2]), this gives another proof of the above theorem. 
REMARK 21. The next example illustrates that if a TU-game is not pseudoconcave w.r.t, es- 
sential coalitions, then a unique pairwise-modest (or greedy)-bargained consistent allocation is 
not necessarily equal to the nucleolus. Obviously, condition (4) holds for all three person-games, 
so we present a four-person counter example. Let us consider the following assignment game 
(see [7,8]). Let N := FUM,  where F := {1,2} is the set of women and M := {3,4} is the set of 
men. The characteristic function v of this assignment game is defined by 
max [hi3 + a24, a14 + a23], 
max [a,k, aj~], 
v(S) := max [aij, aik], 
aij ,  
0, 
if S = N, 
i fS={ i , j , k} ,  i, j EF ,  kEM,  
if S = {i,j,k}, i E F, j ,k E M, 
i fS= {i,j}, iEF ,  j EM,  
otherwise. 
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Let us treat the numerical example where matrix 
This numerical game is not pseudoconcave w.r.t, essential coalitions, because 
v({1, 4}) > max [0, v(N)  - (As + A3) ] . 
The unique pairwise-modest (or greedy)-bargained consistent allocation is given by 
xl(A) = xa(A) =max[6-  A,3], 
x2(A) = x3(A) =max[4-  A,2], 
Xl(~) +X2(~) +X3(~) +X4(~ ) = 12, 
from Remark 19, since v(N)  > (A  1 -[- m 2 q- m 3 -~ A4)/2. This equation yields 
P(v )={(x1(2) ,x2(2) ,x3(2) ,x4(2) )}  = {(4,2,2,4)}. 
On the other hand, it can be shown that 7/(v) -- (4.5,1.5, 1.5, 4.5), which concludes that 7~(v) 
{rl(v)} in this assignment game. 
5. RELAT IONSHIP  BETWEEN NUCLEOLUS AND T-VALUE 
Theorem 16 states that the set of pairwise-modest (or greedy)-bargalned consistent allocations 
is a singleton for the pseudoconcave games w.r.t, essential coalitions. The next lemma shows that 
the set of pairwise-medium-bargained consistent allocations is also a singleton. 
LEMMA 22. I f  f ( i )  ~ Ai  for all i 6 N and Y~ieN f ( i )  < X ~ Ei6g Ai, then there exists a 
unique x C R g such that  E ieN Xi "~ X and x is pairwise-medium-bargained consistent, and x 
is given by 
X - ~-]~jeN f ( J )  (Ai  - f ( i ) ) ,  for all i E N. (22) xi = f ( i )  + E jeN (A j  - y ( j ) )  
PROOF. Suppose x is pairwise-bargained consistent with reference point e. Then x satisfies the 
following equations by Lemma 2: 
xi = f ( i )  + 
(xi + xj  - f ( i )  - f ( j ) ) (A i  - f ( i ) )  
Ai  - f ( i )  + A j  - f ( j )  ' 
for all i, j E N and i ¢ j. 
This yields 
xi - f ( i )  x j  - f ( j )  
-- for all i , j  E N and i ~ j. 
A i  - f ( i )  A j  -- f ( j ) '  
Therefore, there exists some constant K such that 
xi - f ( i )  = K(A i  - f(i)), for all i G N. (23) 
By summing all these expressions and using Y~ieN xi = X, we have 
K = x - E ,~N S(O 
)~ieN (Ai  -- f ( i ) )"  
By substituting this expression into (23), we obtain (22). I 
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If we interpret f and A appropriately in TU-games, then the pairwise-medium-bargained 
consistency is closely related to the T-ValUe. The r-value of (N, v) is an allocation given by :)1 
Ti(V) := by - gV(g) A A v, for all i • N, 
where 
by := v(N) - v (N - {i}), 
gv(s) := ~ b~ - v(S), 
jES 
A~ := min[g"(S) I S C N, i • S], 
if the game (N, v) is quasi-balanced, that is, 
A v _> O, for all i • N and 
for all i • N, 
for all S C N, 
for all i • N, 
E (b~ - A~) <_ v(N) <_ E b~. 
jeN jEN 
Let f( i )  := by - Ay and Ai := by for all i • N. Then the quasibalancedness of (N, v) implies 
that f( i )  < Ai for all i • N and )--~jeN f( J)  <- v(N) < EjeN Aj. Now we show that x in 
expression (22) is just equal to the v-value if X = v(N). By substituting f ( i )  = b~ - A~, Ai = b~' 
and X = v(N) into (22), we have 
x - E~eN f(J) (A~ f(i)) 
x~ = f ( i )  + ~jeN (Aj - f ( j ) )  
v(Y)  - ~"~j~g (by - A~) 
= b~ - ~ + ~y 
=b~ + 
E jcN A'~ 
= by E j~ ~ 
= Tdv). 
Therefore, we have proved the following theorem. 
THEOREM 23. Let f( i)  := Ai - A~ and Ai := v(N) - v(N - {i}), where (N,v) is a TU-game 
and i E N. If (N, v) is quasi-baJanced, then the T-value T(V) is a unique pairwise-medium- 
bargained consistent M1ocation. 
If the smallest and largest amount hat player i can claim are regarded as Ai - A~ and v(N) - 
v (N - {i}), respectively, then the v-value is a quite natural allocation in the sense that it is 
pairwise-medium- bargained consistent. 
We set f( i )  := v({i}) for all i E N in Theorem 16 and f( i )  :-- by - A~' for all i E N in 
Theorem 23. If a TU-game (N,v) which is pseudoconcave w.r.t, essential coalitions is also 
semiconvex, then both theorems can apply to the TU-game (N,v) since b~ - A~ = v({i}) for 
all i E N. We say that (N, v) is semiconvex if 
b~ > v({i}) and v(S) -  E b~ <_ v({i}), (24) 
jes-{i} 
for all i E N and all S C N with i • S where by := v(N) - v(N - {i}). Therefore, the next 
corollary follows immediately. 
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COROLLARY 24. Let f( i )  := v({i}) and As := v(N) - v(N - {i}), where (N, v) is a TU-game 
and i E N. If (N,v) satisfies (4),(5) and (24), then the nucleolus rl(v ) agrees with a unique 
pairwise-modest (or greedy)-bargained consistent a//ocation, whereas the T-value T(V) with a 
unique pairwise-medium-bargained consistent allocation. 
Corollary 24 says that the nucleolus and the T-value are characterized by the pairwise-bargained 
consistency with different reference points for semiconvex pseudoconcave games w.r.t, essential 
coalitions. 
We give a necessary and sufficient condition for a pseudoconcave game (N, v) w.r.t, essential 
coalitions to be semiconvex in the following lemma. The condition (25) means that it is more 
profitable for every player to stay alone than to form the grand coalition N on the understanding 
that other members receives their marginal contribution w.r.t, the grand coalition N. 
LEMMA 25. Suppose a TU-game (N, v) satisfies (4),(5). Then (N, v) is semiconvex if and only 
if it satisfies 
v(Y) -  ~ Aj  < v({i}), for all i  • N. (25) 
3eN-{~} 
PROOf. It is sufficient o prove that (25) implies (24). Since b~ = As ---- v(N) - v (N - {i}), the 
first condition (24) follows from (5). Since i • S, we have 
v({j}) < ~ A j+v({ i} )= ~ b~+v({i}) and 
jes j~s-{i} jes-{~} 
v(Y) -~ A i=v(N ) -  ~ Aj+ ~ Aj 
j eN-S  j6N-{i} j6S-{i} 
_< v({i}) + Z = 
j6S-{i} j6g-{i} 
Therefore, (24) follows from (4). 
b;+v({i}). 
REMARK 26. If [M[ > 1 (the number of managers i more than 1) in the pseudoconcave game 
w.r.t, supersets of the managers, then (25) is satisfied. For IMt > 1 means that v({i}) -- 0 < As 
for all i E N, A1 = A2 = v(N) (we assume 1, 2 E M), and thus, (25) holds. Therefore, in the 
pseudoconcave game w.r.t, supersets of the managers with more than one manager the nucleo- 
lus and the T-value are reinterpreted by pairwise-bargained consistency with different reference 
points. 
6. REMARKS ON B IMATRIX  AND CONCLUSION 
In Section 2, we used the bimatrix in Table 1 to explain three reference points c, d, and e. We 
can also use other bimatrix games to explain these reference points. The bimatrix in Table 2 is 
obtained by changing the roles of players i and j, which is also constant-sum, in other words, 
it is a transposed bimatrix of Table 1. Whereas the bimatrix in Table 3 has a different feature: 
it is not constant-sum. One story of this bimatrix game is as follows: player i's strategy is to 
choose a pair of behaviors how each player should behave (both players are not allowed to behave 
in the same way), whereas player j 's strategy is to decide whether both players should accept 
player i's proposal or not ("A(ccept)" or "N(ot accept)"). We suppose that if player j 's  strategy 
is "N", then each player receives the surplus of the total amount as if the opponent behaved in 
the way player i chooses. For example, if player i chooses "(Boldly, Cautiously)" and player j
chooses "N", then player i receives X - Aj and player j receives X - f( i) .  Because the sum of 
the payoffs of both players may exceed the total amount X, this game is used only to determine 
reference points. The key point to make such bimatrix games is as follows: we have four payoffs 
for player i (j), f( i )  < Ai, X - Aj  < X - f ( j )  ( f ( j )  < Aj, X - A~ <_ X - f( i )) ,  respectively. By 
using these payoffs we want to make bimatrix games which has no pure strategy Nash equilibria. 
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Suppose the player i's part of the bimatrix is given in Table 4. Since this bimatrix has no pure 
strategy Nash equilibria, h2 and t21 must be f ( j )  or X - Ai. If t12 : f ( j ) ,  t21 = X - Ai, and 
the game is constant-sum, then we have Table 1. If t12 = X - Ai, t21 = f ( j ) ,  and all four points 
are not on the straight line through AB in Figure 1, then we have Table 3. All three bimatrix 
games given in Tables 1-3 may be artificial, but they express an aspect of conflict in deciding 
reference points between players. 
Table 2. Another associated bimatrix game, where f( i)  + f ( j )  <_ X <_ Ai + Aj.  
Player j
C B 
Player i Y(ou) f(i), X - f(i) Ai ,  X - A i  
i x - y ( j ) ,  . f ( j )  x - A j ,  A~ 
Table 3. Associated nonconstant-sum bimatrix game, where f( i) + f ( j )  <_ X g 
A i + Aj. 
Player j
A N 
Player i (C,B) f(i), Aj  X - f ( j ) ,  X - Ai 
(B,C) Ai, f ( j )  X - -  Aj, X - -  f( i)  
Table 4. Bimatrix game, where f( i)  + f ( j )  <_ X < Ai + Aj .  
Player j
Player i Strategy 1 
Strategy2 
Strategy 1 Strategy 2 
I ( i ) , tn  
Ai, I~21 
X - f(j),t12 
X - A j ,  t22 
Let us consider the bimatrix game given in Tables 1 and 2 as a Nash bargaining problem (see, 
for example, [9, Chapter 8]). The Nash bargaining solution with threats of this game is a pairwise- 
medium-bargained consistent allocation. If we take the maxmin or the minmax values to be a 
disagreement point, that is, c or d to be a disagreement point, then the Nash bargaining solution 
of this game is a pairwise-modest (or greedy)-bargained consistent allocation. In the context of 
Nash bargaining problem, it is quite strange to take the minmax values to be a disagreement 
point, because the disagreement point should not be better than the Nash bargaining solution 
for both players. But this correspondence b tween our pairwise-bargained consistency and the 
Nash bargaining solution does not hold in the bimatrix games given in Table 3, because we look 
for a reasonable reallocation of the amount X between the players in our context but they seek 
a reasonable outcome in the context of the Nash bargaining problem. 
In this paper, we considered the relationship between the nucleolus and the T-value of a trans- 
ferable utility game (N, v) through an associated bimatrix game. This bimatrix game has three 
important values; the maxmin and the minmax value within pure strategies and the game value 
within mixed strategies. We showed that if (N, v) is pseudoconcave w.r.t, essential coalitions, 
then the nucleolus coincides with a unique pairwise-bargained consistent allocation with refer- 
ence point being the maxmin (or the minmax) value of the associated bimatrix game, whereas 
that if (N, v) is quasi-balanced, then the T-value coincides with a unique pairwise-bargained con- 
sistent allocation with reference point being the game value. The bankruptcy games and the 
pseudoconcave games w.r.t, supersets of the managers are, of course, pseudoconcave w.r.t, essen- 
tial coalitions. And the class of all pseudoconcave games w.r.t, essential coalitions is the same 
as the class of games which have a nonempty core that is determined only by one-person and 
(n - 1)-person coalition constraints. We also give a sufficient condition which guarantees that 
the bargaining set coincides with the core in this class of games. 
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